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Abstract—This paper introduces a scheme for achieving trust-
worthy computing on SoCs that use an outsourced AXI inter-
connect for on-chip communication. This is achieved through
component guarding, data tagging, event verification, and con-
sequently responding dynamically to an attack. Experimental
results confirm the ability of the proposed scheme to detect HT
attacks and respond to them at run-time. The proposed scheme
extends the state-of-art in trustworthy computing on untrustwor-
thy components by focusing on the issue of an untrusted on-chip
interconnect for the first time, and by developing a scheme that
is independent of untrusted third-party IP.
Index Terms—Hardware Trust, Hardware Security, Design for
Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization in the IC supply chain raises a particular
concern about the malicious modifications that potentially
untrusted parties in this chain could introduce in SoCs, i.e.,
hardware Trojans (HTs). A type of HTs that have gained
special attention in literature are HTs embedded in outsourced
IPs, as such IPs are heavily relied-on in the SoC industry
given the stringent limitations on design overhead and time-
to-market. A large number of publications attempt to address
the issue of HTs in 3PIPs from the pre-deployment HT
detection perspective. However, the extent to which real-
life HTs will pass undetected is an open question, as our
knowledge of HTs is based on some hypothetical assumptions
and most papers evaluate their ideas using research-based
benchmarks [1], rather than realistic Trojans. Consequently, to
achieve robust protection against HTs, systems should include
dynamic countermeasures that are capable of detecting the
malicious actions of HTs and responding to them effectively
at run-time. Such countermeasures aim to achieve trustworthy
computing on untrustworthy components (TCUC). At its core,
TCUC involves run-time monitoring combined with proactive
dynamic responses to any inferred HT attack.
Run-time monitoring is effectively the last line of defense
against HTs and, according to the latest survey on HTs
and their countermeasures [2], developing run-time monitor-
ing techniques is a key future research direction for secure
computing. To this end, several TCUC techniques have been
proposed in the literature; that are based on mechanisms
such as task scheduling [3], verifiable computing [4], and
the implementation of micro-controlled elements in enforcing
security rules [5]. The issues identified in prior TCUC propos-
als indicate the importance of developing techniques that are:
(a) widely applicable in many types of SoCs, (b) impose mini-
mal design and computations overheads, (c) are hard-wired for
resilience against software attacks, and most importantly (d)
are fully independent from third-party IP vendors. The TCUC
scheme proposed in this paper addresses these requirements,
and to our knowledge, is the first TCUC work that succeeds
in doing so.
II. THREAT MODEL
The AXI protocol is one of the most widespread of the
AMBA protocols introduced by ARM. Due to their prevalence,
AXI interconnects are viewed as standard circuit elements
and are often outsourced, raising in turn serious concerns
regarding their trustworthiness. The HT scenarios expected
from an untrustworthy AXI interconnect and that are targeted
in this work are data diversion in which the interconnect
diverts packets from their actual destination, data modification
where the interconnect manipulates data that passes through
it, shadowing attacks in which the interconnect keeps a copy
of the data passing through it so that it can later leak it out
of the system, illegitimate access to resources by trying to
initiate read/ write requests without receiving corresponding
requests from the master IPs in the SoC, and finally DNS of
the request or data flooding type. The targeted HT scenarios
that could be initiated by the untrustworthy 3PIPs through
their facilitation of the AXI interconnect or in collusion with
it are illegitimate access to a certain slave IP/ address by one
of the master IPs, masquerading attacks where one IP poses
as another to the interconnect, and shadowing and flooding-
based DNS attacks that revolve around a slave IP using the
interconnect to transmit some data without it being involved
in a corresponding on-going transaction.
III. THE PROPOSED TCUC SCHEME
The HT scenarios presented in section II indicate that
the root cause behind the potential success of any of them
is the capability of an untrustworthy AXI interconnect or
3PIP to either modify a transaction as it passes through the
interconnect or to initiate an unexpected transaction. The
absence of any limitations on their actions and interactions
represents a vulnerability that must be mitigated at run-time
by imposing constraints that restrict the actions of a 3PIP
to only those that satisfy its functionality and comply with
its specification. The key to our proposal is an appropriate
set of run-time constraints on the interconnect and the 3PIPs
that can provide the security guarantees that would counter
the presented HT scenarios and achieve TCUC. The proposed
TCUC scheme is based on combining the guiding principles
of component guarding, event verification, and data tagging.
These guiding principles are summarized as:
• Component guarding: involves monitoring, logging, and
keeping track of the progress of every transaction that
passes through the interface of the untrustworthy 3PIP.
• Event verification: involves ensuring that the events oc-
curring at the interface of the untrustworthy 3PIP are
expected and within its functional and access boundaries.
• Data tagging: involves using tags and IDs to identify the
transmitted data and confirm its integrity.
These guiding principles are imposed by security elements
that act as wrappers around the IPs in the SoC. These wrappers
are applied to the IPs in the system by the SoC integrator
at build time, and require no internal knowledge of the IPs
themselves. Each wrapper has a unique ID that identifies both
the wrapper and the data issued by that wrapper; an important
measure in preventing masquerading attacks. The wrappers
serve as monitoring and HT-action prevention elements and
they have full observability over the signals and events that
occur at the interfaces of the wrapped IPs.
An example of a SoC with n master IPs and m slave IPs
is shown in fig. 1. In this figure the wrapper of the AXI
interconnect is denoted as W(AXI) whereas the wrappers of
the master IP Mi and slave IP Sj are denoted W(Mi) and
W(Sj), respectively. The wrapper of the AXI interconnect
contains master and slave interface units U(Mi) and U(Sj)
for each master and slave respectively. Each interface unit
implements state machines to monitor and verify the signals
for the five AXI channel. Additionally, the AXI wrapper
contains a collection of small memories to log key information
related to each transaction that passes through the interconnect.
The transaction logs are denoted TR log, whereas DATA log
denotes the logs that track data transfers. The logs are arranged
to allow simultaneous access from master and slave interface
units, thereby allowing transactions to proceed through the
AXI network without any reduction in throughput. The wrap-
per of a master IP comprises an access control unit and a data
tag generation unit for generating tags for the data beats sent
by the master IP when in write data mode. The wrappers of
slave IPs consist of data tag generation units that are associated
with the read data. Each tag is specific to the data beat and
the ID of the source IP for that data.
IV. RESULTS AND FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION
Wrappers for our proposed TCUC mechanism were written
in Verilog and integrated in a modelled SoC based on a
combination of open-source and Xilinx IP blocks. The design
was simulated under both normal conditions and malicious
Fig. 1. Deployment of proposed TCUC IP wrappers in a SoC
conditions where HT scenarios presented in section II were
modeled and induced in the SoC. The simulated results show
that in both cases of operation, the wrappers add a fixed latency
of three clock cycles to each of the channels in the AXI read
and AXI write interfaces (except the write response channel,
in which the added latency is two clock cycles). Additionally,
all of the induced HT scenarios were successfully detected by
the proposed wrappers, and the corresponding transaction in
each case was blocked.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the first TCUC technique that targets on-
chip interconnects. The proposed technique extends the state-
of-art in the field through its independence from untrusted IP
vendors, its low computational overhead, and its hardwired
implementation. By developing a fully hardwired technique
we minimize the threat surface, as it cannot be attacked
from the software level. Additionally, the proposed technique
is somewhat universal as its guiding principles could be
applied to any on-chip interconnect. The wrappers developed
to test the principles of the scheme can be configured and
deployed with comparatively low effort, mainly requiring an
SoC integrator to specify the number of master and slave IPs,
the allowed address range for each master IP, and the size of
the transaction logs.
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